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NOTES & COMMENTS
LOSS AND TRANSACTION CAUSATION: THE
SECOND CIRCUIT RESOLVES THE CAUSATION
CONTROVERSY IN MAJORITY CONTROL
SITUATIONS
A corporate shareholder seeking relief' under § 10(b) or § 14(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act' for injuries arising from a materially'
misleading proxy solicitation must prove that the alleged misstatement or omission' in the proxy statement was the cause-in-fact of his
The question of proper relief in cases involving proxy violations is a difficult one.
The types of relief most commonly sought include rescission of the transaction, damages claimed to have resulted from the violations, and injunctive relief to halt the
challenged transaction. See generally Note, PrivateEnforcement of the FederalProxy
Rules: Remedial Alternatives, 15 WM. & MARY L. REv. 286 (1973).
2 Securities Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970), states that it shall
be unlawful for any person, in connection with the purchase or bale of a security, to
employ a manipulative-or deceptive device in contravention of SEC rules.
Securities Exchange Act § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970), is more limited in
scope and makes it unlawful for any person to contravene SEC rules in the solicitation
of proxies.
The question of materiality in proxy statement cases has caused much confusion. The most recent statement regarding materiality by the Supreme Court appears
in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970). The Court stated in Mills:
Where the misstatement or omission in a proxy statement has
been shown to be "material,". . . that determination itself indubitably embodies a conclusion that the defect was of such a character that
it might have been considered important by a reasonable shareholder
who was in the process of deciding how to vote.
Id. at 384 (citation omitted). See also Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 331 F.
Supp. 981, 986 (D. Del. 1971); Beatty v. Bright, 318 F. Supp. 169, 173 (S.D. Iowa 1970);
Berman v. Thomson, 312 F. Supp. 1031, 1033-34 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
Misstatements and omissions are not the only types of misleading information
in proxy statements. The SEC has set forth the following examples of what may be
considered misleading:
(a) Predictions as to specific future markets values, earnings, or
dividends. (b) Material which directly or indirectly impugns character, integrity or personal reputation, or directly or indirectly makes
changes concerning improper, illegal or immoral conduct or assocations, without factual foundation. (c) Failure to so identify a proxy
statement, form of proxy and other soliciting material as to clearly
distinguish it from the soliciting material of any other person or persons soliciting for the same meeting or subject matter. (d) Claims
made prior to a meeting regarding the results of a solicitation.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1974) (examples following § 240.14a-9(b)).
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injury. Proof of this causation element is impossible,5 according to
some courts,8 when the corporate management controls enough votes
to secure approval of the transaction in question' without the votes
of the minority shareholders who allege injury.8 These courts have
reasoned that the allegedly injurious transaction would have occurred
even if all the minority shareholders had voted against the proposal.
However, other courts have cited the willful falsification or omission
of material facts,' the broad remedial purposes of the federal securities laws,' 0 and the fact that once misled, a minority shareholder may
forfeit his right to take other protective action in holding that causa5 See, e.g., Barnett v. Anaconda Co., 238 F. Supp. 766, 770-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
See Hanover v. Zapata Corp., [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
93,904, at 93,626 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Smith v. Murchison, 310 F. Supp. 1079 (S.D.N.Y.
1970); Adair v. Schneider, 293 F. Supp. 393, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Robbins v. Banner
Indus., Inc., 285 F. Supp. 758, 762-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Hoover v. Allen, 241 F. Supp.
213 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Barnett v. Anaconda Co., 238 F. Supp. 766, 773-74 (S.D.N.Y.
1965).
7 Proxy statements may be sent out by management seeking shareholder approval
of any number of proposed corporate actions including mergers, the sale of assets or
stock, and dissolution. Despite the use of proxy statements, however, management
generally has more information concerning the actual terms of these transactions,
making possible the types of abuses which § 14(a) was designed to prevent, von Mehren
and McCarroll, The Proxy Rules: A Case Study in the Administrative Process, 29 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROB. 728, 729 (1964).
1 The affirmative votes of minority shareholders are not needed whenever management owns any controlling interest. Thus, if a majority vote is required and management owns over 50 percent of the voting shares, the result may be a foregone conclusion.
, See Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 906 (1969); Heyman v. Heyman, 356 F. Supp. 958, 966-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Weber
v. Bartle, 272 F. Supp. 201, 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Laurenzano v. Einbender, 264 F.
Supp. 356, 361 (E.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd on other grounds, 448 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1971).
,1 See generally J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1968), and cases cited in
note 9 supra. The Court in Borak stated:
The purpose of § 14(a) is to prevent management or others from
obtaining authorization for corporate action by means of deceptive or
inadequate disclosure in proxy solicitation.
377 U.S. at 431. In addition, both the Senate and House reports on § 14(a) indicated
a broad remedial purpose. The Senate Report stated:
In order that the stockholder may have adequate knowledge as to
the manner in which his interests are being served, it is essential that
he be enlightened not only as to the financial condition of the corporation, but also as to the major questions of policy, which are decided
at stockholders' meetings. Too often proxies are solicited without explanation to the stockholder of the real nature of the questions for
which authority to cast his vote is sought.
S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1934). See also H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 13-14 (1934).
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tion was sufficiently established to impose liability."
In Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp.,'2 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a plaintiff-shareholder 3
who alleged injury from corporate mismanagement and proxy violations had stated a valid cause of action 4 under § 10(b) and § 14(a)
and Rules 10b-5' 5 and 14a-911 despite the fact that management held
a controlling number of votes. In so holding, the court ended a longstanding debate among the district courts over whether causation
could exist in a management-control situation." More importantly,
however, the Schlick court attempted to promulgate standards by
which the causation element could be measured.'" Although this deci-'
sion will end the disagreement among the district courts of the Second Circuit," the standards and terminology it developed may prove
2°
difficult to apply.
The causation debate among the district courts traces its origins
to the Supreme Court's opinion in JI. Case Co. v. Borak,2' which first
established a private right of action under § 14(a) of the Exchange
Act.22 More important to this analysis, however, is the fact that the
Court did not determine whether the plaintiff had to prove a causal
connection between a defective proxy statement and an allegedly
" A misled shareholder's forfeited rights may include appraisal rights, the right
to sue in state court for injunctive relief, and the possibility of using publicity to
discourage management from pursuing a given course of action. See, e.g., Laurenzano
v. Einbender, 264 F. Supp. 356, 360 (E.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd on other grounds, 448 F.2d
1 (2d Cir. 1971).
12507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'g [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 94,163 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
,1 The instant case was brought as a class action pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(1)(A) and FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). For the district court decision refusing to
dismiss a derivative action brought under the same facts, see Schlick v. Castle, CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,909 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 1974). The court there held that a pending
class action did not render the derivative action meaningless. Id. at 97,906.
" Schlick was before the Second Circuit on appeal from the district court's ruling
that the plaintiff's complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted
under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974).
" 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1974).
" See text accompanying notes 36-51 infra.
" See text accompanying notes 70-71 infra.
" See text accompanying notes 77-81 infra.
20See text accompanying notes 82-93 infra.
21 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
2 The Court pointed out that the 1934 Act would be far more effective if private
actions were allowed to supplement criminal proceedings against violators. Id. at 43335.
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injurious merger which had been approved by only "a small number
of votes." This difficult question, the Court stated, was one of fact
which was best determined by the trial court" thereby implying that
some causal link between violation and injury was necessary.25 Thus
left without Supreme Court guidance as to how the requisite causal
link should be shown, the lower courts proceeded to promulgate a
number of conflicting causation requirements."
In this setting the Supreme Court decided Mills v. ElectricAutoLite Co.,2 the leading case on the element of causation under § 14(a).
The plaintiffs in Mills were minority shareholders of Electric AutoLite Company who were suing to set aside a merger of Auto-Lite and
Merganthaler Linotype Company. Prior to the merger, Merganthaler
had owned slightly more than 50 percent of Auto-Lite's common
stock. Because a two-thirds vote of Auto-Lite stock was necessary to
endorse the merger, however, the affirmative votes of at least some
minority shareholders were needed to approve the transaction.28 The
plaintiffs claimed that these votes were "indispensible to the approval of the merger,"' and that they had been fraudulently solicited. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the proxy statement
had failed to disclose that Auto-Lite's directors, who had unanimously recommended the merger, were nominees of Merganthaler
and "were under the control and domination of Merganthaler. ' '3
" The plaintiff was the owner of 20,000 shares of Case stock and claimed that the
merger, "was approved at the meeting by a small margin of votes ... ; [and] that
the merger would not have been approved but for the false and misleading statements
Id. at 430.
in the proxy solicitation material .
2A Id. at 431.
n1 Obviously, little authority on this issue could be gleaned from § 14 of the
Exchange Act, which did not provide for individual suits. See note 2 supra.
2 The most stringent test promulgated by the lower federal courts required that
a plaintiff allege and prove that but for the defective proxy statement, there would not
have been enough votes to approve the proposed transaction. See, e.g., Barnett v.
Anaconda Co., 238 F. Supp. 766, 771 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
Other courts held that there need only be a substantialprobability that the misleading solicitation caused the transaction to be approved. See, e.g., Gerstle v. Gamble
Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66, 98 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), modified, 332 F. Supp. 644
(E.D.N.Y. 1971), modified, 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973).
Finally, the easiest test to meet stated that the causation requirement was satisfied if the solicitation of proxies served some cognizable function in the transaction.
See, e.g., Laurenzano v. Einbender, 264 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
396 U.S. 375 (1970).
28 The court stated that, "At the stockholders' meeting, approximately 950,000
shares, out of 1,160,000 outstanding, were voted in favor of the merger." Of these,
317,000 were votes of minority shareholders. Id. at 379.
29 Id. at 379.
30 Id. at 378. Although the factual situation in Mills involved only an omission,
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The Supreme Court recognized the impracticality of requiring the
plaintiff to show that the alleged omission actually caused each of the
approving minority shareholders to vote for the merger.31 Instead, the
Court held that a finding of materiality would raise a presumption
that the alleged proxy defect had caused the challenged transaction
to take place." In order to complete a showing of causation, the Court
continued, the proxy solicitation itself must be shown to be "an essential link in the accomplishment of the transaction.",,
Despite this effort to clarify the causation requirement in Mills,
the Supreme Court was not faced with a management-control situation as presented in Schlick.Y The inherent difficulty in applying the
Mills analysis to the Schlick facts was establishing that the proxy
solicitation was an essential link in the accomplishment of the
merger, even though no votes solicited by proxy were necessary for
approval. The district courts of the Second Circuit had been grappling with this problem for some time prior to the Mills decision, and
the opinion specifically dealt with both material omissions and misstatements.
The district court, on plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, ruled that the
claimed omission was material; and because the merger could not have been carried
out without minority stockholder approval, held that a causal relationship existed
between the proxy violation and the merger. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 281 F.
Supp. 826 (N.D. M. 1967). The Seventh Circuit, however, noting the difficulty involved in attempting to show whether the alleged omission actually caused each of the
317,000 approving minority shareholders to vote as he did, ruled that this issue should
be determined by considering the fairness of the bargain itself. 403 F.2d 429, 436 n.10
(7th Cir. 1968). The court apparently reasoned that a shareholder would vote to approve a fair transaction without being misled, but a misleading proxy statement might
be necessary to convince a shareholder to vote for an unfair merger. As sound as this
reasoning might seem, it was specifically rejected by the Supreme Court. 396 U.S. at
382 n.5.
3' 396 U.S. at 382.
2 Id. at 384. See also note 3 supra. Cf. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457,
462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 211 (1965).
3 396 U.S. at 385.

1 The Mills court stated:
We need not decide in this case whether causation could be shown
where the management controls a sufficient number of shares to ap-

prove the transaction without any votes from the minority.
396 U.S. at 385 n.7. However, the Court hinted rather broadly that the causation
requirement might be satisfied:
[e]ven in that situation [management control]; if the management finds it necessary for legal or practical reasons to solicit proxies
from minority shareholders, at least one court had held that the proxy
solicitation might be sufficiently related to the merger to satisfy the
requirement.
Id. (citations omitted).
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5
the two conflicting lines of authority continued thereafter.1
The Southern District of New York, in Barnett v. Anaconda Co.,-"
was the first court to hold that causation was lacking in a management-control situation. That case involved a transaction in which
all the stock of Anaconda Wire and Cable Company, seventy-three
percent of which was owned by the defendant Anaconda, was transferred to a newly-formed Anaconda subsidiary in exchange for
Anaconda stock. Wire and Cable was then dissolved, and the Anaconda stock distributed to its shareholders. Plaintiff Barnett, a former Wire and Cable shareholder, alleged that the exchange was part
of a scheme to acquire Wire and Cable's assets for inadequate consideration and that the proxies approving the transaction had been
fraudulently solicited. 7
The district court was unimpressed with Barnett's allegations, 31
however, and in holding that no cause of action had been stated under
§ 10(b) or § 14(a), noted that Anaconda's management, "the alleged
villain of the piece,"39 could hardly have been misled by its own proxy
statement. The court reasoned that the proxy statement could not
have been the cause-in-fact of the transaction, since the dissolution
of Wire and Cable would have been approved on the strength of
management's votes alone. Thus, Barnett and the cases which followed it4" were based on the belief that there could be no causal link
between violation and transaction when the alleged proxy defects
were coupled with management control.
The opposing line of authority began with Laurenzano v. Einbender.1' That case, decided by the District Court for the Eastern
District of New York, also involved a series of management machina-

See notes 8-9 supra.
238 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
11Id. at 768-70.
31Id. at 771.
39Id.

,0Those cases following Barnett are collected in note 8 supra. Many of these
opinions, however, relied on the Barnett holding without commenting on its logic, see,
e.g., Laufer v. Stranahan, [1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,617,
at 98,774-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) ("In the absence of binding authority," Barnett will be
followed.) Furthermore, the courts often indicated that their decisions were also influenced by the inadequacy of the plaintiff's complaint. As the court stated in Adair v.
Schneider, 293 F. Supp. 393, 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), "The complaint openly and defiantly violates [FED. R. Crv. P.] 8(a)(2) . . . .It is an extended embroidery of what,
if true, would be mere evidence, recited in perplexing and disjointed detail." See also
Smith v. Murchison, 310 F. Supp. 1079, 1082 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
11264 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd on other grounds, 448 F.2d 1 (2d Cir.
1971).
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tions culminating in the merger of two corporations on allegedly unfair terms which were not disclosed in the proxy solicitation.42 The
Eastern District agreed with the Barnett court that the critical question was whether the proxy material had a "transactional furiction" 4
in bringing about the merger, despite the fact that management held
a controlling number of votes. However, while recognizing that minority votes were not required for approval of the transaction, the
Laurenzano court pointed out that such votes were far from useless."
A vote showing minority consensus could encourage directors to proceed with a fraudulent scheme,45 and misleading material might well
prevent minority hareholders from seeking injunctive relief in the
state courts." Finally, the court reasoned, the broad remedial purposes of the Exchange Act indicated that actions seeking redress for
misleading proxy material should be encouraged." Thus, the
Shareholders in Retail Centers of the Americas, Inc. brought suit alleging that
the defendants employed defective proxy statements in obtaining shareholder approval
for the sale of Retail's assets.
The full factual situation in Laurenzano defies summarization. If a full factual
statement is desired, one must look to the opinion itself.
"The court stated:
It may be supposed that J.I. Case Co. v. Borak requires that the
accused proxy material (whether considered in the perspective of Section 10 or Section 14 of the '34 Act) have a transactional function and
not merely be randomly present in the context of the transaction with
respect to which a remedy is sought.
264 F. Supp. at 360.
42

" Id. at 361.
" In Laurenzano, 95% of the minority shareholders voted in favor of the merger.
The court stated that an unfavorable vote might have brought about a "modification
or reconsideration" of the transaction. Id.
46 In Laurenzano, an injunctive action was brought in the state court but was
subsequently dismissed because the plaintiff could not supply the required security
bond. The plaintiffs claimed in the federal court that a truthful proxy statement would
have ensured joinder in the action of other stockholders owning $30,000 worth of stock,
thus making a security bond unnecessary. 264 F. Supp. at 361.
'

The court stated:

Section 14(a). . . exacts candor of disclosure, not fairness of substantive terms, and phrasing an attack on unfairness of terms as a failure
of the proxy material to acknowledge that unfairness does not transform the attack on unfairness of terms into a case of federal cognizance
264 F. Supp. at 361. Other remedial actions which can be taken by minority shareholders include the exercising of appraisal rights which might be forfeited if the shareholder
votes in favor of the transaction, see Note, Causationand Liability in PrivateActions
for Proxy Violations, 80 YALE L.J. 107, 114 (1970); and the seeking of publicity to halt
the transaction. See generally Note, Private Enforcement of the FederalProxy Rules,
Remedial Alternatives, 15 WM. & MARY L. REv. 286, 299 (1973).
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Laurenzano court concluded that even in a majority-control situation, a proxy solicitation was "calculatedly infused into the matrix
of the transactions,"48 served a definite purpose for majority and minority shareholders, and satisfied the causation requirement.
Both the Barnettand Laurenzano lines of authority dealt with the
problem of showing a causal link between the alleged proxy violations
and the challenged transaction. Indeed, only one pre-Schlick district
court decision specifically addressed the question of whether the challenged transaction had caused an actual loss rather than the question
of whether the alleged violation had caused the transaction to take
place. In Lewis v. Bogin5 the court mentioned the BarnettLaurenzano split but stated that it did not have to reach the transaction question. Even if all the plaintiffs allegations regarding the misleading proxy statement were true, the court pointed out, the price
paid for the plaintiffs stock pursuant to the merger plan had been
judged fair in an appraisal proceeding." Thus, although the misleading proxy material might conceivably have caused the transaction to
take place, that transaction had not harmed the plaintiff.5
The apparent aim of the Second Circuit in Schlick was to settle
the Barnett-Laurenzanodispute and at the same time to clarify the
difference between the transactional focus in those cases and the
264 F. Supp. at 361.
337 F. Supp. 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). On June 6, 1967, Conde Nast Publishing, Inc.
merged with Patriot Nast Publishing Co. Patriot had owned 87% of the Conde Nast
stock and the defendant owned 94% of Patriot. The complaint alleged that the merger
was unfair and had been fraudulently solicited, and requested rescission and damages.
Id. at 332-33.
Id. at 334.
51 Id. at 337-38. Two other cases present interesting variations on the causation
theme. In Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972), although the challenged
merger was admittedly unfair, the facts regarding the merger, including the unfair
aspects, were all contained in the proxy solicitation. The court stated:
Appellant argues that disclosure is irrelevant when, as here, the minority shareholders are powerless to prevent the merger. We do not
agree. In this case, armed with information fully disclosed with compulsion of the federal proxy regulations and Rule 10b-5, appellant was
placed in a position to sue under state law to enjoin the merger as
unfair.
Id. at 720. Thus, in Popkin, although the plaintiff suffered a loss, the challenged
transaction was not caused by a proxy violation, and no recovery could be had under
federal law. Id. This, of course, is still consistent with the policy of encouraging complete disclosure envisioned by the proxy laws. See note 10 supra. See also Kohn v.
American Metal Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 290-91 (3d Cir. 1972) (plaintiff estopped from
claiming "Mills reliance" if he has notice from his lawyer that a proxy statement is
misleading).
"
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loss-oriented approach used by the Bogin court. The Schlick action
was begun when a minority shareholder of Continental Steel Corporation"2 filed a complaint in the District Court for the Southern District
of New York, stating that between 1967 and 1969, the defendant
Penn-Dixie Cement Corporation had acquired over 50 percent of Continental's common stock and had placed six Penn-Dixie directors on
Continental's nine-member board. After gaining control of Continental, the complaint alleged, Penn-Dixie began to utilize that corporation's funds for its own benefit, thus lowering the value of Continental's stock in relation to Penn-Dixie's. With the value of Continental
stock thus deflated, the Penn-Dixie-controlled board of Continental
proposed a merger of the two corporations. A proxy statement seeking
approval of the merger, however, failed to disclose, among other
things, that Penn-Dixie had allegedly inflated the value of its stock
at Continental's expense. 3
Based on these general allegations, and despite the fact that the
proposed merger had not yet taken place, the plaintiff requested
that he and the other minority shareholders" be awarded damages55
of no less than ten dollars for each share of Continental stock they
owned. The claim for relief contained allegations of a scheme to
defraud Continental shareholders in violation of Rule 10b-5, one element of which was the alleged use of misleading proxy statements.
This use of misleading statements was in turn alleged to constitute a
separate violation of Rule 14a-9.57
Addressing the Rule 14a-9 claim first, the district court noted that
the causation question in management-control situations had specifically been left open by the Supreme Court in Mills,5" but only briefly
5, John Schlick was the owner of 2,000 of Continental's two million outstanding
shares of common stock. Continental itself was an Indiana corporation whose shares
were publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange. Complaint at 3a, Schlick v.
Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 94,163
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 1973) [hereinafter cited as Complaint]. See Schlick v. Penn-Dixie
Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 376 (2d Cir. 1974).
Complaint, supra note 52, at 9a-13a.

" See note 13 supra.
" The merger was consumated on May 11, 1973 while the suit was pending.
Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 376-77 n.3 (2d Cir. 1974).
59Complaint, supra note 52, at 21a.
57 Pendant jurisdiction under United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966),
was sought for two common law counts based on claims that the defendants had
breached a fiduciary duty owed to the plaintiff growing out of their control of Continental and in so doing had caused the plaintiff's injury. Complaint, supra note 52, at 19a20a. See Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 377 (2d Cir. 1974).

u See note 34 supra.
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mentioned the two conflicting lines of authority on the issue." Instead, the court emphasized that the only damage alleged by the
plaintiff was the unequal exchange ratio" and seemed to reason that
this type of injury was not one for which the federal securities laws
granted relief." Furthermore, the plaintiff had failed to allege any
other loss cognizable by a federal court under Rule 14a-9.2 In the
absence of such contentions, the court stated that there was no injury
flowing from the misleading proxy statement and thus no § 14(a)
cause of action. 3 In considering the Rule 10b-5 claim, the court was
even more brief, stating only that the allegations under § 10(b) were
conclusory" and that, in any event, the plaintiff had conceded that
if his Rule 14a-9 claim fell, his Rule 10b-5 claim must also collapse. 5
This concession apparently did not impress the Second Circuit,
which first addressed the question of whether the Rule 10b-5 allegations were conclusory.66 The court conceded that had the complaint
only alleged management actions which "operated as a fraud and
deciet on the purchasers and holders of Continental stock,"6 it
would, indeed, have lacked the particularity necessary in a Rule 10b5 claim.6 8 However, the Schlick complaint also contained allegations
11[1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,163 at 94,723-24. The
district court stated that both lines of authority assumed that some causation had to
be shown between the alleged violation and the alleged injury and that when, as in
this case, there was no real damage, the causation requirement was irrelevant. Id. at
94,724.
60 Id.
6, The exact words used by the court were:
The deficiency in the instant complaint stems from the absence
of any allegation of injury which was caused by the proxy violations,
aside from that claimed to flow from the unequal ratio.
Id. The circuit court found this language confusing. See 507 F.2d at 383-84.
" See notes 45-47 and accompanying text supra.
' At no point in its opinion did the district court clarify the reasoning behind its
holding that an unfair exchange ratio was not a loss which could be redressed through
a federal securities action.
64 The court relied on Segal v. Gordon, 467 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1972). The complaint
in Segal was dismissed for failure to state a cause of action; however, the complaint
involved there was not nearly as specific as that in Schlick. See 467 F.2d at 605.
65 [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. RzP.
94,165 at 94,724. Plaintiff's
attorneys apparently felt that if proxy violations were alleged, the elements of proof
under Rule 10b-5 were sufficiently similar to those under Rule 14a-9 to make separate
arguments untenable. See also note 75 infra.
66 Had the Second Circuit agreed with the district court, it would have addressed
the Rule 14a-9 issue first since its finding there might well have been dispositive of
the Rule 10b-5 claim.
" Complaint, supra note 52, at 10a.
507 F.2d at 378. See FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
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of specific acts, such as the use of Continental's bank accounts by
Penn-Dixie,69 which tended to show a plan to defraud, conceived and
carried out by the Penn-Dixie directors. The court thus reasoned that
because the plaintiff had alleged specific acts of corporate
mismanagement, the complaint did not fail for want to specificity."
With this preliminary question answered, the Second Circuit addressed the major causation issues presented by the complaint. In an
apparent effort to clarify the causation requirement in the
Laurenzano-Barnett management-control situation, the court proposed dual tests involving distinct causation requirements. First a
plaintiff must allege "loss causation" by pleading that the misrepresentations or omissions in the defective proxy statement caused him
economic harm. Second, the injured party must meet a "transaction
causation" requirement by alleging that the proxy violations caused
him to engage in the transaction in question. 7
The complaint stated:
[B]alances in bank accounts of Continental were utilized by PennDixie, as compensating balances for its own borrowings, and for PennDixie's benefit with Penn-Dixie's lending banks-all without compensation or benefit to Continental; thus depriving Continental of its
ability to use its own capital to expand its business.
Complaint, supra note 52, at 1Oa. Other allegations of specific misconduct carried out
by Penn-Dixie's management included the use of Continental's funds to engage in a
real estate venture in Florida with a "special customer" of Penn-Dixie, and the charging of excessive inter-company costs to Continental, "thus reducing Continental's
income and increasing that of Penn-Dixie." Id. at 11a. See Schlick v. Penn-Dixie
Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 378 (2d Cir. 1974).
Although each of these allegations was stated on information and belief, and
several cases had held that such contentions could not satisfy FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b), see,
e.g., Lee v. Alabama, 364 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1966), the Second Circuit concluded that
the particularity requirement was satisfied because the allegations were accompanied
by a statement of the facts upon which the belief was founded.
"

11507 F.2d at 379.

By supporting the complaint with allegations of mismanagement, however, the
court raised the seemingly immortal spectre of Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193
F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952), which had held that suits based
solely on corporate mismanagement could not be brought under § 10(b) of the Act and
that the class of persons entitled to sue under § 10(b) was limited to purchasers and
sellers of securities. Id. at 464. Although Schlick involved purchasers and sellers of
securities, it was arguable that under the court's analysis, the complaint fell under the
Bimbaum stricture against suits based on corporate mismanagement. As the Second
Circuit noted in Schlick, however, the Supreme Court's holding in Superintendent of
Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971), while impliedly affirming the buyerseller requirement, severely altered the mismanagement limitation. Under the Court's
reasoning in Bankers Life, the corporate mismanagement had only to be carried out
in connection with the purchase or sale of securities to be cognizable under § 10(b).
11507 F.2d at 380. These concepts were originally used in Note, Causation and
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The court first applied this analysis to the Rule 10b-5 claim. In
Schlick the § 10(b) cause of action was not based solely on the alleged
proxy violations,72 but on a scheme to defraud in which the misleading proxy statement was only one element. Since the proxy solicitation was not the primary object of the court's inquiry, the merger for
which proxies were solicited lost its overriding significance; proof of
transaction causation was not required. 3 Thus, in order to meet the
Rule 10b-5 causation requirement when a scheme to defraud was
involved, the court held that the plaintiff need only plead loss causation, i.e., that his injury resulted from the scheme to defraud carried
out by Penn-Dixie's directors.74 This requirement was met by the
plaintiff's allegation that the unfair merger ratio resulted from the
inflation of Penn-Dixie stock in relation to Continental."
Liability in Private Actions for Proxy Violations, 80 YALE L.J. 107, 123-24 (1970).
72 See

notes 69-70 and accompanying text supra.

11507 F.2d at 381.
74Id.
75 Id. In most important dicta, the court stated that if the Rule 10b-5 claim had
been based solely on alleged proxy violations, the question of whether transaction
causation need be shown would depend on whether the plaintiff had alleged only
material omissions, or affirmative misstatements in the proxy materials. 507 F.2d at
380-81. Relying on Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972), the
Second Circuit asserted that no transaction causation need be shown in omission
cases. The validity of this assertion is questionable, however.
Affiliated Ute had dealt with the question of whether a seller of securities was
required to show that he had actually relied on the buyer's failure to reveal material
facts in order to state a valid Rule 10b-5 claim. In that case the Court stated:
Under the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a failure
to disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery.
All that is necessary is that the facts withheld be material...
Id. at 153. Obviously, it would be unreasonable to require a showing of reliance in such
a transaction when only an omission was involved. It is difficult to imagine any injured
plaintiff attempting to prove that he relied on what the defendant did not tell him.
However, the court in Schlick used the terms "reliance" and "transaction causation" interchangeably in discussing the causation requirements for Rule 10b-5 actions
based on proxy violations. The two terms are not in fact identical. Under the Mills
rationale, which was expanded by Schlick to include majority-control situations, an
injured plaintiff need only show that the omission or misstatement was material, and
that the proxy solicitation itself was an essential link in the accomplishment of the
transaction. He need not show that he "relied" on the specific misstatements or omissions. See text accompanying note 33 supra. See also note 30 supra.
Thus, as many courts have implied, see, e.g., Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper
Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 374 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973); Barnett
v. Anaconda Co., 238 F. Supp. 766, 776 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Laurenzano v. Einbender,
264 F. Supp. 356, 360 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd on other grounds, 448 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1966),
the important distinction between Affiliated Ute and Mills is not the fact that Mills
dealt with Rule 14a-9, and Affiliated Ute with Rule 10b-5. Rather, the relevant differ-
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The court approached the Rule 14a-9 claim differently. Under
Rule 14a-9, the proxy violations were the only cognizable violations
of the Act. Thus, the question of whether the alleged misstatements
and omissions caused the injurious transaction was of central significance, and the court required both loss and transaction causation.
The loss causation requirement, the court held, was satisfied by the
plaintiff's allegation of economic harm resulting from the unfair exchange ratio." Transaction causation, however, was more difficult to
plead and prove.
In finding that the plaintiff in Schlick had met the transaction
causation requirement, the court relied heavily on Laurenzano and
its progeny" for the proposition that minority shareholders were deprived of their "recourse to measures other than the casting of proxies""8 by the promulgation of a materially misleading proxy statement. Therefore, under the Mills test, the proxy solicitation was an
essential link in the accomplishment of the merger, despite the fact
that the proxies themselves were not needed for affirmance. In addition, the court noted that the broad purposes of the Exchange Act
seemingly refuted the idea that all manner of fraud and overreaching
would be tolerated under the Act simply because a controlling shareholder existed."
Thus, in Schlick, the Second Circuit effectively overruled the
Barnettline of authority by holding that a minority shareholder could
show a misleading proxy statement to be an essential link in the
accomplishment of a merger, and could therefore state a valid Rule
14a-9 cause of action, in spite of a controlling majority. Certainly, this
decision will further the purposes of the Exchange Act" and the
proliferation of private suits under § 14(a) and § 10(b).11 Unfortunence is that the Mills test was meant to apply to actions for proxy violations, while
Affiliated Ute was not. The opinion in Schlick would have been clearer, as well as more
correct, had the court indicated that the same transaction causation test applicable
to Rule 14a-9 was also applicable to Rule 10b-5 actions involving only proxy violations.
There seems to be no logical reason to require transaction causation at all times under
Rule 14a-9 and not to require it in Rule 10b-5 omission cases involving only proxy
violations. See generally Note, The Reliance Requirements in Private Actions Under
SEC Rule 10b-5, 88 HARv. L. Rev. 584 (1975).
71507 F.2d at 381-82.
n See 507 F.2d at 382.
IsId., quoting Heyman v. Heyman, 356 F. Supp. 958, 968 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). See
also notes 45-47 and accompanying text supra.
1' 507 F.2d at 382, quoting Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., 415 F.2d 1326,
1331-32 (7th Cir. 1969).
8See note 10 supra.
11See note 22 supra.
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ately, however, the Second Circuit may have been premature in its
adoption of the dual loss and transaction causation standards.
Using the dual standards set out in Schlick, a court should first
determine whether the alleged proxy violation caused the plaintiff's
loss, and then whether the same violation caused the challenged
transaction to take place. 2 The Schlick court first applied these tests
to the Rule 10b-5 claim. However, as the court noted, this count was
based upon a full spectrum of corporate mismanagement rather than
solely upon the misleading proxy statement; and this broad basis for
the claim was certainly proper in light of the expansive scope of §
10(b). Thus, once the court had taken the corporate-mismanagement
approach, the proxy statement and the transaction voted upon lost
their importance. The major point of inquiry became whether a causal link could be shown between the management violation, which
was the manipulation of stock, and the alleged injury, in this case the
unfair exchange ratio. This connection between the full range of management violations and the alleged injury was the loss causation required by the court. A showing of transaction causation was not
necessary because the intervening merger, although carried out in
connection with the scheme to defraud, was not of overriding importance.
In Rule 14a-9 actions, however, and in Rule 10b-5 actions based
solely on proxy violations," the transaction for which proxies are
solicited assumes greater significance. Plaintiffs in these cases will be
squarely faced with the Supreme Court's admonition that the proxy
statement be an essential link in the transaction for which approval
is sought. Thus, proof of transaction causation as defined in Schlick
becomes necessary.
Although the Second Circuit's basic concept of dividing loss and
transaction causation was sound, the Schlick court may have failed
to recognize that the basis of any causation requirement is the presence of a causal link between a violation and an injury." The transaction is only an intervening occurrence in these situations. Thus,
rather than two separate tests, each using the alleged proxy violations
as a point of departure, the correct analysis may call for a single, twostep test to determine first, whether the violation was casually connected to the transaction, and second, whether that transaction"
507 F.2d at 380.

Id. at 381.
See note 75 supra.
See text accompanying notes 1-3 supra.
It may be necessary to qualify this proposed test, however, to the extent that
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caused the plaintiff's injury." A close analysis of the Schlick opinion
itself shows why this two-step test may be analytically preferable to
the dual tests proposed by the Second Circuit.
In discussing the Rule 14a-9 cause of action, the Schlick court
stated that the same injury used to satisfy the loss causation requirement under Rule 10b-5, the unfair exchange ratio, also satisfied the
Rule 14a-9 loss causation requirement." This statement seems to
ignore the fact that the Rule 10b-5 claim was based on a multifaceted scheme to defraud, while the Rule 14a-9 claim was, by definition,89 based solely on a misleading proxy statement. The court did
not even attempt to show that the misstatements and omissions in
the proxy statement, without more, caused the promulgation of an
unfair exchange ratio. Indeed, the court would have been hardpressed to do so, as the proxy statement may well have been written
the unfair elements of the transaction in question must be the cause of the plaintiff's
injury rather than any aspect of the transaction. Thus if a corporation fails after a
merger approved by fraudulently solicited proxies, the courts may not want to find the
requisite loss causation in instances when the failure was in no way connected with
the unfairness of the merger. On the other hand, considering the need for full disclosure
in all solicitations, the courts may want to hold fraudulent solicitors of proxies liable
whenever a resulting transaction causes injury.
91A helpful analogy might be to envision the plaintiff as having to travel between
two points, "violation" and "injury." Between these two points lies a third point,
"transaction." The Schlick test would require that the plaintiff firsttravel from "violation" to "transaction." He would then have to return to his starting place in order to
travel to "injury."
Under the proposed test, however, plaintiff travels from "violation" to "transaction," and then on to "injury" without having to return to his point of departure.
This latter test, although not specifically set forth in any single case, seems to have
been assumed in several. See, e.g., Swanson v. American Consumers Indus., Inc., 475
F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1973); Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972). See also,
JENNINGS AND MARSH, SEcuRrriss REGULATION at 1353, 1357 (3d ed. 1972). In dividing
the issues to be considered in a § 14(a) action, those authors suggest two relevant
questions: "What connection must be shown between the Proxy Rule violation and the
action taken at the meeting?" and "What connection must be shown between the
action taken at the meeting and the injury to the corporation?" (emphasis added).
u 507 F.2d at 381. The court seemed occasionally to forget that "causation" implies that one event causes another. Thus in dealing with loss causation under Rule
14a-9, the court stated:
As to count two of the complaint based upon alleged proxy violations, as we have said, quite plainly appellant has alleged loss causation or economic loss in that there was an. . . unfair... merger ratio
• . . by which he obtained fewer Penn-Dixie shares. . than he would
have. ...

Id. (emphasis added).

" See note 3 supra.
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after the exchange ratio was determined. It was not the misleading
solicitation that inflicted the harmful ratio on the plaintiff, but the
merger itself." Thus, under the Second Circuit's test, the court arguably should not have found loss causation to be present in Schlick. If
the court had considered the question of whether the merger had
caused the plaintiff's injury, however, its analysis would have led
directly to the desired result, as the unfair merger was the immediate
cause of the plaintiff's loss.
In determining whether the causation requirement had been met
in regard to the plaintiff's proxy claim, the Schlick court should first
have considered whether a causal connection existed between the
misleading proxy statement and the merger, using the Mills and
Laurenzano analyses. Having found this connection to exist, however, the next step 1 should have been to determine whether the
merger caused the plaintiff harm. This approach is as conceptually
simple and easy to apply as the Second Circuit's dual test, yet it
maintains the analytical integrity necessary to insure consistent results.
In Schlick, the Second Circuit undeniably settled the causation
question left open in Mills and moved toward a final resolution of the
causation controversy. However, Judge Frankel may have been correct when he stated in his concurring opinion" that the transaction
and loss causation tests were too innovative to be used without a
thorough investigation of their possible implications.93 In light of the
logical inconsistencies which appear to be present in the Schlick opinion, this investigation has not been sufficiently thorough, and the
chances for consistent application of these tests are questionable.
RICHARD McKIM PRESTON

0 The same criticism could be applied to the Rule 10b-5 loss causation analysis.
It is difficult to see how the unfair exchange ratio could have harmed the plaintiff
before the merger took place. Under Rule 10b-5, however, the plaintiff alleged that a
broad range of managerial actions caused him injury. Perhaps the major problem was
the court's reluctance to allow the Rule 10b-5 claim to be based on the same proxy
violations which supported the Rule 14a-9 cause of action. See note 75 supra.

" The Schlick court first determined the loss causation issue, and then the transaction causation issue. Apparently, the court felt the former to be an easier determination.
" 507 F.2d at 384.
93Id.

